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Social entrepreneurship holds a significant position throughout 
the public and private agenda. This type of organisation is  
seen by policymakers, business leaders, researchers, and  
practitioners as a key mechanism for tackling complex  
socioeconomic and environmental challenges.
Following this line, Social Impact Bonds (SIBs) have emerged  
as an innovative funding tool to work as a smart partnership  
between the public and private sector, in order to address  
complex challenges and increase social welfare. However,  
despite the relevance that SIBs have gained during the last  
few years, they are still perceived as a ‘black box’. Therefore,  
there is a need to develop a significant understanding of how  
this system works, who the actors involved are, what kind of  
outcomes it generates, and if so, how to measure their  
effectiveness.
This report casts a light on these questions, by exploring and  
exploiting potential pathways to use SIBs in Chile. In fact, the  
work provided by Kimmitt and Muñoz is perfectly timed. First, 
because social enterprises have gained a relevant traction within 
Chile during the last decade. And secondly, because this report 
provides an important link with previous evidence generated  
by Muñoz, Kimmitt, Serey and Velazquez (2016). This research  
emphasizes the structure (i.e. challenges) and dynamics (i.e.  
interactions) of social enterprises in Chile to deliver social value. 
Findings provided by the mentioned research suggest that  
impact measurement is one of the key drivers to legitimising 
the ‘social promise’. This is a highly relevant contribution to both 
policymakers and social investors. On one hand, policymakers 
have the fiduciary responsibility to allocate resources where their 
programmes may have a relevant effect. If social entrepreneurs 
measure their impact, then it is easier to determine whether a  
policy (e.g. subsidies) is working. Also, on the other hand, social 
investors are always trying to figure out how to reduce the risk in 
their investments while generating a positive impact. Therefore, 
impact measurement helps to attract investors because that 
provides certainty regarding the real effect (or not) that a social 
enterprise creates through their solutions.
Executive Summary
Drawing on this logic, SIBs could be a good vehicle in Chile  
for addressing social challenges with an outcome-based  
perspective. But, as can be seen in this report, international  
evidence shows that this type of mechanism (public-to- 
private contract), can be very complex in practice. Therefore,  
governments have a growing interest in better understanding  
the role and effectiveness of SIBs, as well as the risks of its  
implementation.
Based on this context, this report will be useful to policymakers, 
social investors, entrepreneurs, researchers, established  
companies, and any other stakeholder that is seeking to  
understand how to design and run an outcome-based contract 
(SIB). It should be noted, however, that this effort should not end 
up here. As Kimmitt and Muñoz expose later, SIBs are not the  
target, instead, it is more a medium that might help spur and  
enhance a social investment market in Chile.
Finally, this report comes during an inflexion point in Chile where 
it is critical to design better tools that lead us to a better future 
and a better society. How to achieve it? Through a set of policies 
and innovations that steer us to be more entrepreneurial and  
experimental in the way social challenges are solved. Thus, in 
order to unlock the “SIB effect”, more evidence is needed. This 
is where Chile has a privileged position to explore SIBs as a new 
mechanism.
For all these reasons, I am very pleased to recommend this  
report as a relevant and timely contribution to everyone who is 
concerned about how to address long-term social challenges  
and social welfare.
Rodrigo Frías
Director of Early Investment, Entrepreneurship Division
Corfo
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The 2016 report on the structure and dynamics of social  
entrepreneurship in Chile1 identified some of the key drivers  
of the sector. Since that time, we have embarked on trying to 
understand what tools and support mechanisms can be put in 
place to assist the social enterprise sector. In this report, we  
focus on one specific emerging tool – Social Impact Bonds (SIBs) 
– and the role it may have in developing the sector. This report is 
developed by researchers in the UK at Newcastle University and 
the University of Liverpool and through on going collaborative 
efforts with social entrepreneurs and higher education institutions 
in Chile. It is funded by the Economic and Social Research  
Council, UK. 
Social entrepreneurship, as a form of entrepreneurial activity,  
has grown exponentially in Chile in recent years. This has led 
to significant public investment in the development of support 
mechanisms and an entrepreneurial culture that allows this type 
of entrepreneurship to thrive and, ultimately, for some of the  
nation’s challenging social problems to be alleviated. 
Despite this, our study2 draws our attention to four key  
challenges facing the sector: investment, business models  
and growth, impact measurement, and collaboration. This report  
will unpack those four challenges in more detail and position  
SIBs as a potential new approach for tackling them. Although  
investment, business models and growth are not unique  
to challenges facing ‘commercial’ entrepreneurs, they are  
somewhat different in this space where social investment  
is needed to represent the important social and economic  
outcomes of social entrepreneurship. As we will identify,  
impact measurement and collaboration are particularly  
unique to the sector and require new approaches. 
In this way, the report was developed around three overall  
objectives:
l	To identify the four main challenges facing the social  
 enterprise sector
l	To explore the potential for SIBs as a potential solution to  
 these challenges
l	To identify policy implications concerning the design  
 and implementation of SIBs in Chile
many of which are not available for traditional  
entrepreneurship. The sector needs to urgently  
develop robust business models that consider 
existing opportunities and take advantage of the 
strengths of social entrepreneurship (rather than 
focus on solving threats and weaknesses). It  
requires a business modelling toolkit that considers  
organizational forms, public-private collaboration, 
linking of sustainable standards and diversification  
of income sources, the latter oriented to the  
improvement of value chains and markets for  
social entrepreneurship.
Social investment infrastructure. While the  
basic conditions are in place to promote social  
entrepreneurship and investment, there is still  
a need to move towards the formalization of  
more direct intervention instances such as the  
promotion of new market structures with greater  
diversity of intermediaries and sophistication in 
investment tools. Currently, the financing alternatives 
used by social entrepreneurs begin to fall  
significantly after 6 months of trading, and the early 
stages are mainly covered by the entrepreneurs’ 
own capital, friends - family and seed capital. For a 
rapidly growing industry, it is surprising that only 18% 
of entrepreneurs receive investment after 24 months. 
Since social entrepreneurship is focused on solving  
a social problem, the incentive for traditional  
investors is low, as the promise of economic  
return becomes a secondary objective. In other 
words, there is the challenge of improving the  
understanding of the problems and those who try  
to solve them, recognizing the public role played  
by social entrepreneurs. In this vein, the study  
highlights four key challenges: the need for a  
better understanding of the determinants of social 
investment, the need for a more diversified social 
investment portfolio, the improvement of investment 
prospects (i.e. social entrepreneurs capable of  
leveraging their uniqueness and clarifying their 
routes to impact and returns) and the need of  
boundary objects to facilitate the interactions and 
transactions between social entrepreneurs and  
(social) investors. 
Impact measurement. The ability to conduct  
impact measurement is increasingly a priority for 
organizations operating in social industries. While 
relevant, it remains as one the most intractable  
practices, not only difficult to grasp but also to  
be conceptualized. There is a range of tools and  
frameworks available to social enterprises seeking 
to monitor and communicate evidence of their social 
impact, however, the Chilean social industry is still in 
its infancy. In order to improve social accountability, 
demonstrate the robustness of their approach  
to social value creation, attract investment and  
consolidate their relations with public sector  
actors (based on impact rather than intentions),  
the sector is in urgent need of standards and tools  
for measuring social impact. This involves not only 
the measurement of social and economic outputs, 
outcomes and impact, but also the continuous  
monitoring of goal-oriented actions, achievement  
of objectives, learning and planning of growth  
strategies and investment in line with results.
Boundary-spanning collaboration. Robust social 
business models require the development of  
appropriate mechanisms to open and sustain a close 
collaborative relationship between social venture 
and the public sector. Alongside providing seed  
impact funds, the public sector should advance in 
the development of commissioning around social 
needs, rather than simply promoting socially- 
friendly entrepreneurship (as a little sibling of  
entrepreneurship). Social impact bonds certainly 
open up an alternative for financing and income,  
but there is a great diversity of contractual forms  
for such commissioning that could be used, that  
can eventually kick start a social investment market 
in the country. The report emphasizes the need of  
more flexible collaboration mechanisms between 
the social enterprise and the public sector (central 
and local). The social solutions developed not  
only require in-depth knowledge of the specific  
problem it seeks to resolve, but also of the social  
mechanisms that operate in conjunction with the 
problem. Alongside such commissioning, the sector 
should move towards developing mechanisms  
for alliances, contracts, impact monitoring and  
measurement, and also elaborate on the ways  
in which entrepreneurs and government agencies  
can co-develop solutions with consideration of  
the complexity of social problems and the need for 
monitoring systems to evaluate the achievement of 
the proposed objectives, under such complexity. 
Social Entrepreneurship in Chile
Social entrepreneurship has grown significantly in 
Chile in recent years, alongside social movements 
and calls for action around the creation of social and 
economic impact in the formation of start-ups. It has 
captured public attention and attracted a significant 
number of organizations and institutions of various 
kinds, which have come together around the core 
idea of proposing solutions to be considered in their 
public and private programmes, and plans. 
Several issues have contributed to its legitimacy, 
mostly linked to its potential and social movements 
and initiatives supporting it. First, they have the  
potential to create social and economic value  
simultaneously, contributing to the delivery of  
public services. They are better positioned to  
confront and recover in situations of crisis and social 
pressures, building resilience within the enterprise 
and across the ecosystem. Likewise, they can  
potentially demonstrate how alternative business 
models and operating structures can become  
feasible in the market, and eventually outperform 
their commercial counterparts.  
Many seem to advocate on its behalf, as seen in 
the surge of B Corps, the emergence of dedicated 
investment funds and subsidies, and the ongoing 
debate around an ad-hoc legal framework for them. 
While promising and exciting, evidence suggests 
that the social industry is still far from recognising 
its promises and actually deliver market and  
social value. Four challenges and areas of work  
were highlighted in the 2016 study: business  
models and distinctive growth, social investment 
infrastructure, impact measurement and  
boundary-spanning collaboration. 
Business models and distinctive growth pertains  
to the unique ways in which social enterprises  
create and escalate social value, which is central  
to improving the competitiveness of social  
entrepreneurship. As social entrepreneurship  
grows, it becomes necessary to consider more 
seriously that this is not just about creating socially 
friendly companies, where the traditional logic of  
entrepreneurship “should” work. This is about a  
different way of creating and delivering social  
welfare, which requires a type of organizational form 
and business model appropriate to its unique reality. 
The majority of the industry believes that the social 
component of the business influences purchasing 
decisions, and that profitability is not indeed  
negatively affected by emphasising the social  
mission. The social component of the business 
comes to complement the value proposition,  
allowing them to gain a better position in the  
market against products with similar characteristics. 
Interestingly, while the social industry grows to  
compete against traditional for-profit companies, 
decisive competitive strategies seem to remain 
absent from the range of actions social enterprises 
use. There are certainly differences between purely 
social and purely commercial extremes; however, 
once the social mission has been incorporated into 
the core of the business, there is a great diversity of 
grey areas that adds complexity to the sector as well 
as development opportunities. A hybrid model offers 
the possibility of combining not only sources  
of investment, but also different sources of income,
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Figure 2 - Key facts and figure on SIBs4
SIBs have proliferated somewhat in recent years; 
some key facts and figures can be found in Figure 2. 
As of September 2018, it is reported that there have 
been 118 impact bonds contracted around the  
world in a variety of social domains5. In developing 
economy contexts, they are also referred to as  
“Development Impact Bonds” (i.e. DIBs) with the  
fundamental difference concerning the lack of a 
government outcome funder. These outcomes are 
typically paid by philanthropists and/or foundations. 
SIBs and DIBs have focused on a wide range 
of issues including homelessness, jobs and 
unemployment, girls’ education, coffee production, 
well-being amongst others. For example, the 
Colombian SIB focuses on increasing employability 
amongst vulnerable young populations, a seriously  
challenging problem in Latin America, over the 
course of a 5 year programme. Regardless, SIBs  
or DIBs represent approaches for funding and  
focussing on outcomes. In the following, we will 
briefly outline the advantages and disadvantages  
as documented by current research in the area.
Supporters of SIBs highlight the importance of  
bringing new investment into this domain and  
the alignment of goals between such organizations, 
government commissioners and social investors. 
Indeed, SIBs are seen as a financially innovative 
solution in a public sector context that is not typically 
regarded as such6. Thus, SIBs are a collaborative  
tool for bringing together key stakeholders with  
a common goal7 8 ; a clear link to one of the  
challenges facing the social enterprise sector in 
Chile. Indeed, Lowe, Kimmitt, Wilson, Martin and  
Gibbon, 20189 identified that SIBs perform a  
particularly unique function at a policy level  
by aligning the varying ‘discourses’ between  
collaborators. SIBs, therefore, represent a narrative  
of public sector reform and a development of  
outcome-based contracting or ‘payment by  
results’10.
 
Beyond collaboration, they also represent a  
potentially important new form of capital for social 
purpose organisations such as social enterprises  
and the voluntary sector. This form of capital is quite 
unusual for the sector because it is typically large 
scale and works over a long-time scale. In addition, 
the private sector involvement is also seen as a 
method for improving ‘rigor’ amongst social purpose 
organizations in terms of their capacity to manage 
such contracts and do the requisite data collection  
to meet performance outcomes. 
Social Impact 
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Social Impact Bonds
In 2010, the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Justice 
launched the world’s first Social Impact Bond (SIB). 
SIBs have emerged as a new policy tool, which is 
designed to link the outcomes of social interventions 
to payments with the risk, in theory, being borne by 
a private investor rather than through public funds. 
SIBs are a type of ‘outcomes-based’ contract,  
which bring together investors (socially oriented 
investment), commissioners (government or  
foundation) and social purpose organisations (such 
as social enterprise or charities); the investment in 
such an organization is designed to facilitate their 
delivery of services. The fundamental idea is that  
investors provide upfront working capital and if/
when the outcomes of the service being delivered  
by the social purpose organizations are met, a  
commissioner will repay the investor at a set rate  
of return. These outcomes are measured according 
to particular methodologies such as randomised 
control trials or use of baseline surveys. Logically, 
therefore, if the social outcomes are not met,  
investors stand to lose their investment. The  
roles of each key player are outlined in Figure  
1 and developed from an early report by  
Gustafsson-Wright and colleagues3. As shown  
in an early report, SIBs can vary in how they are  
designed and implemented and there is no strict 
rules or guidance on how they should be designed.
Figure 1 - Basic Model of SIBs 
Investors
IntermediaryOutcome
Funder
Evaluator
Service
Provider(s)
Target
Population
Invest working capital
Bypass intermediary
Delivers 
social
intervention
Beneficiary of
social intervention
Structures deal and
manages contract
Evaluates outcomes
of intervention
Funds outcome
payments
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Case Example
HealthSIB (anonymised) is a SIB programme focusing 
on the improvement of long-term health conditions 
and well-being in a Northern City in the UK. The 
service is designed to complement medical services 
in one part of the city, by linking particular individuals 
into community services with the aim of improving 
their long-term health conditions and well-being. 
The focus is on being healthier, active and  
developing positive relationships. The underlying 
rationale is that when individuals are better able  
to manage their own health conditions then this  
will reduce their reliance on medical services thus  
reducing their cost to the health service. The  
practice of being referred into these services is 
known as ‘social prescribing’. 
The programme began its life in its development in 
2011 with the local Clinical Commissioning Group 
(CCG) responsible for the payment of outcomes –  
a CCG is a health body responsible for the planning 
of health care services in a local area. The initial 
working capital for this work is provided by one of the 
key actors in the social investment space in the UK. 
HealthSIB went operational in April 2015 with 7  
years of funding which will reach out to 11,000  
beneficiaries. Therefore, it represents a significant 
investment in this type of activity and its  
subsequent impact. The impact of the intervention  
and its payments are triggered in two ways: (1) 
through the numbers recruited by service providers 
and their subsequent improvement in well-being 
scores (the programme uses a standard accepted 
well-being measure here); and (2) through reduction 
in secondary care costs (i.e. hospital admission).  
It is the latter, which commissioners regard as  
particularly crucial to reduce their expenditure  
and improve the health of their populations. This is  
measured by comparing hospital admissions in one 
part of the city with another part. 
Figure 3 highlights the set of relationships and  
interactions between all the key stakeholders.  
At the top of the map, we have the local service  
health commissioner (i.e. the state) who is 
primarily interested in reducing hospital visits 
and thus pays for these outcomes. Below, we have 
the operational vehicle or ‘Special Purpose Vehicle’ –  
a new organization created to manage the SIB  
programme. The social investor provides the working 
capital to this organisation who then manage the 
next set of organisations – ‘Service Delivery  
Organisations – who actually run care programmes  
in the community and work with clients. Above,  
these providers also have a relationship with GP 
practices – referring services – for whom they rely 
upon for referrals into their programme. The social 
investor will make payments to the operational  
vehicle when referral and well-being targets are  
met. The idea being that once well-being improves 
(outcome 1) then hospital admissions will  
subsequently reduce (outcome 2). 
To observe the effects of the programme on hospital 
admissions, the SIB necessitates data comparison 
between hospital admissions in one part of the city 
(where the intervention takes place) and another  
part of the city (where the intervention is absent).  
This is said to provide a more reliable data  
comparison in a quasi-experimental methodological 
design. As Figure 3 highlights, there are also a  
number of other players in this space such as social 
services and other types of well-being provision, 
which is not directly involved in the programme. 
Despite this, they may actually have a role to play in 
determining these outcomes, as we will discuss later. 
Important to note also are the ‘supporting funders’ 
who provided a lot of the initial grant funding for the 
development of the whole SIB. 
However, SIBs have also been the subject of  
criticism. McHugh and colleagues11 discuss SIBs as 
part of a “neo-liberal” shift towards how the public 
sector delivers services by essentially financialising 
social outcomes. Thus, the role of business and  
the private sector represents a controversial  
topic, discussed at notable depth within the UK.  
This private sector mentality has led to further  
criticisms regarding how organizations and  
individuals are managed in these types of contracts 
and the negative outcomes associated with  
performance management. Again, we will return  
to this topic when discussing performance  
measurement and the challenges of performance 
management12 within SIBs. In short, the micro- 
management associated with trying to attain  
complex social outcomes has been criticised  
within the broader philosophical debate13 as well  
as their high transaction costs. As such, those  
who criticise SIBs suggest that such a complex  
mechanism does not necessarily need to be  
created to fund social purpose organizations.
Table 1 – Benefits and Challenges for Stakeholders
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Stakeholder    
   
Service Providers (e.g. social 
entrepreneurs, voluntary  
sector, not-for profits, charities) 
Investors (e.g. social investors, 
philanthropists, foundations) 
Beneficiaries
Commissioner (e.g. govern-
ment, foundation)
Advantages
Service providers receive  
typically large long-term  
capital investment. A number 
of established SIB programmes 
have been designed around  
5-7 years of funding. 
SIBs represent new investment 
opportunities that blends social 
and financial returns.
Beneficiaries receive a service, 
potentially for a longer duration 
than previously
With the initial risk being borne 
by investors, the risk of invest-
ing in social projects is reduced 
and payments only made when 
outcomes are met
Disadvantages
The performance management 
of social outcomes can hold 
organizations accountable  
for outcomes they’re not  
necessarily in control of which 
can elicit gaming behaviours 
Tend to focus on a narrow set of 
outcomes that can be ‘proven’ 
and tested. 
Complicated mechanisms with 
high set up costs; requires a 
lot of design work to make the 
contracts suitable.   
Requirement of intensive data 
collection to generate outcome 
data 
SIBs have high set up costs and 
therefore upfront investments 
are required
Seen by some as politically  
controversial
For example, in the context of the HealthSIB, the 
comparative methodology used for analysing  
hospital admissions in two parts of the city,  
was undermined to an extent when new  
social prescribing initiatives emerged in the  
comparator group. Thus, one of the challenges 
for SIBs is that they often try to tightly control and 
narrow this complexity but in reality, it is difficult to 
escape. This has been hinted at as an issue in other 
DIBs such as Village Enterprise in Uganda which  
sets ambitious outcomes targets yet it conscious  
that outcomes could easily be affected by issues 
outside of their control such as a bad harvest14.  
Similar potential issues were reported in the  
Educate Girls DIB, highlighting the need for 
comparative data but the inescapable effect of  
outside sources on the outcomes under scrutiny15. 
Attribution. The consequence of this inherent  
complexity is that attribution of outcomes – central 
to a SIB contract – are difficult to attribute to the inter
vention itself. In a complexity-world, outcomes are 
the emergent properties of complex systems and 
not just because of particular interventions. This is 
apparent in the example highlighted above where 
the emerging effects of other service provision was 
impacting upon the SIBs ability to ‘prove’ that it had 
achieved the appropriate outcomes. Thus, it raises 
the issue of being cautious of other reported  
outcomes in SIBs and DIBs – such as the enrolment 
figures for the Educate Girls in India – and whether 
that can be attributed specifically to the DIB16 
The relationship between attribution and complexity 
are further accentuated because of the importance 
of context. This means that how a particular social 
intervention works may be very different in one  
place as to another. Therefore, the scope and scale 
of the intervention across multiple areas is important 
when considering attribution. In some cases, such  
as in HealthSIB, it is contained within one broad  
geographic area, but some organizations may  
operate over multiple areas, which are systemically 
different to another, requiring a variety of  
approaches and therefore understanding of  
outcomes. This is consistent with our work trying to 
understand the different context-sensitive pathways 
of social entrepreneurs in Chile where it appears  
to be taken for granted or embedded into how the  
organization works. This can have quite significant 
ramifications for the effectiveness of the  
organization17.
Performance Management. In such a context of 
complexity and attribution challenges, managing  
the performance of those executing a particular  
programme can be very challenging – something 
which was demonstrated in the HealthSIB. In this  
SIB, this work was carried out by the manager of 
the Special Purpose Vehicle but it has been shown 
to occur elsewhere in other SIBs. The performance 
management of the contract has proven challenging 
in SIBs because they demand the hitting of outcome 
targets which trigger payments. This is a serious 
challenge when the need for data to show that 
targets have been met is inconsistent with the reality 
‘on the ground’. Although such outcome measures 
are agreed within the contract, as previously  
highlighted, it is unpredictable and emergent in a 
complex environment. Therefore, when limited flexi-
bility is built into the contract then tensions  
arise through the performance management of  
that contract.
One further evidenced outcome of this performance 
management is how the providers (e.g. social  
enterprises) behave when they are under pressure  
to meet performance targets. The results have 
demonstrated aspects of ‘gaming’ to produce the 
necessary data to trigger payments, which are 
not as useful as outcome measures which can be 
used for internal learning and patient care. For such 
organizations, SIBs elicit the need for an extra level 
of data collection, which can also be onerous. This is 
driven by the SIB mechanism, which necessitates the 
necessary data to ‘prove’ outcomes but this research, 
amongst others, (Lowe and Wilson, 2017), show that 
these requirements can actually alter the behaviour 
of those being performance managed. This can 
also put those doing the performance management 
in a SIB in a very challenging position where they 
are tasked with balancing the important work that 
social-purpose organizations are doing with the 
financial demands of the contract. 
Lessons HealthSIB
From our analysis of this particular SIB, we believe 
there are three particular issues that are intrinsic  
to how SIBs are designed and implemented;  
complexity, attribution and performance  
management. The challenges of complexity set  
the context in which social interventions take  
place with attribution and performance management 
inherently related to it. These reveal challenges  
with establishing a SIB but as we will discuss later, 
what can be done to mitigate these. 
Complexity Dynamics. Social interventions (e.g. the 
activities and missions of social enterprises and such 
organizations) take place in complex systems. As 
identified by Knight et al. (2017), complex systems 
are characterized by their unpredictability and  
emergence, path dependence and contextual  
nature. This means that the outcomes of those  
operating within a system are unpredictable  
but are also shaped by their histories. This  
unpredictability is bound by the context, whereby 
one particular social intervention may not work the 
same in one context as it does in another. 
This has implications for SIBs broadly as well as 
HealthSIB. Given the narrow design of a SIB or  
outcomes-based contracts more generally, they  
take little account of the relationship between the 
wider system and the social intervention being  
funded. This relates to the narrow outcomes  
focus identified in Table 1. This means that the  
effectiveness of a provider’s service/product  
may not necessarily be because of those activities.  
These activities sit within broader contextual and 
system dynamics that also shape the nature of those 
activities. The (even small) effects of the system may 
expedite or be detrimental to what an organization  
is aiming to achieve. 10 11
Figure 3 – Map of HealthSIB
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Table 2 - Implications for SIBs in Chile
Such a focus in investment from the government 
perspective is also likely to be an important step in 
improving the social investment infrastructure. At 
present, most social enterprises principally receive 
informal investment, which limits their potential 
scope and scale. The creation of an outcomes  
fund with a distinct focus is likely important in 
incentivising new social investment into the market 
because it is government who repay the working 
capital that those investors provide to run and scale 
social programmes.
Getting started: identifying and  
prioritising social issues 
In setting up social impact bonds, the identification 
and prioritisation of social issues and target groups 
constitute a fundamental building block. Social  
problems are complex, difficult to define and  
evolve alongside social interventions and other life 
circumstances18. The delineation of an investment 
tool designed to tackle a social problem should  
examine the extent of social issue adequacy and 
problem-SIB fit. The risk of failing to identifying,  
prioritise and assess focal social issues and target 
groups are considerable transaction costs at best or 
absolute infeasibility in the worst case scenario. This 
is particularly relevant to emerging countries new  
to such instruments or lacking ad-hoc institutional 
frameworks.
The question then of how to identify social issues in 
the early design of a social impact bond becomes 
paramount. In the following, the authors recommend 
a basic social impact bond diagnostic tool for  
emerging economies19. The tool is divided into four 
diagnostic categories: problem-solution scope,  
political-regulatory environment, stakeholder  
involvement, and impact providers. Each of these  
is disaggregated into three subcategories. Table  
3 provides an overview of categories and  
subcategories of the diagnostic tool20.
Policy Implications for Chile
Tackling the four challenges
Based on insights from this particular SIB example, 
below, we highlight the intersection between these 
intrinsic issues and the four challenges facing  
social enterprises in Chile. Table 2 emphasises  
that investment, business models, impact  
measurement and collaboration needs to be  
friendly to the complexity of social interventions  
that governments/investors seek to support. This 
has important ramifications for understanding how 
financial instruments, such as SIBs, are placed into 
these delicate environments.  
 
These implications are important in the Chilean  
context irrespective of whether it selects a SIB  
model or looks at other types of commissioning  
approaches. SIBs represent only one type of  
‘outcomes-based’ contract whereby funding is  
tied to the achievement of particular social outcomes 
from an intervention. SIBs have typically only  
been developed in those environments where  
commissioners have been unwilling to take on  
the risk of such projects because its effectiveness  
is not entirely clear. Consequently, it is investors  
who assume this risk. But in other circumstances, 
where commissioners are more convinced of the  
effectiveness of a service, then it is possible that  
it can be funded directly in an outcomes-based  
format. However, the lessons to be learned are 
broadly consistent. 
 
In Table 2, we identify how the four themes can  
be developed according to complexity, attribution 
and performance management issues previously 
identified. This emphasises that contractual  
accountability must accommodate learning in  
multi-stakeholder relationships. This should occur  
by allowing service providers to collect meaningful 
and useful data on their organization’s performance 
(impact measurement) that enhances their own 
learning about the environment they are immersed 
in. This involves recognising that the ‘social problem’ 
that one organization is involved in alleviating is  
naturally tied to other social problems elsewhere  
in the complex system. The effectiveness of one 
organisation’s business model in one part of the 
country may vary when one takes into account local 
dynamics, cultures and other issues. The spirit of  
collaborative learning from meaningful impacts is 
likely much more beneficial for the development of 
the system than isolated social interventions and 
narrow outcome contracts which distort reality and 
potentially become more onerous for all involved.
Therefore, the measurement of outcomes within 
these contractual mechanisms are central. We  
previously identified that the majority of social  
enterprises in Chile are not engaged in impact  
measurement but it is worth stressing that these out-
comes (and impacts) need to be meaningful,  
not onerous and therefore not potentially ‘gamed’.  
In a learning environment, this will be less likely  
to occur because the potential coercive impact  
of performance management may be less severe  
as trust becomes an important ingredient in  
complementing the nature of the contract. This  
is important between the management of an 
intermediary and service providers but also  
between investors, commissioners and others  
involved.       
 
Whilst the above provides general recommendations 
for SIB development in Chile there are additional 
infrastructural apparatus, which are likely necessary 
to support the social enterprise sector and such 
funding models. The UK has established a number 
of thematic funds including, for example, the Life 
Chances Fund, from the Department for Culture, 
Media and Sport to tackle issues around drug and 
alcohol dependency, children’s services, early year’s 
provision, young and older people’s services, and 
healthy lives. £80 million was allocated to this fund. 
In Chile, the focus of government investment is per-
haps less clear. We know from our research that the 
vast majority of social enterprises work in education 
related organizations. Although this is where much of 
the activity exists, it is not clear if this is actually the 
most critical area of investment and focus. 
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Complexity 
Attribution
Performance 
Management
Investment
Investment is  
complexity- 
friendly; viewed 
as adaptive and 
facilitating emerging 
circumstances
Investment is  
flexible and  
accommodating  
of attribution  
issues 
Investment is  
separated from  
the performance 
management of  
the SIB contract 
Business Models  
and Growth
Importance of 
Context: Business 
models adapt and 
change in complex 
contexts. 
Business models 
adapt and learn 
from outcomes
Business models 
are performance 
managed to drive 
continuous learning 
and improvement
Impact  
Measurement
Outcomes (and  
impact) are viewed 
as emergent  
properties of  
complex systems 
and attached to  
other social  
problems 
Outcomes (and 
impact) are not  
attributable to  
single interventions 
but the system
Outcomes (and 
impact) are used to 
instigate learning 
and adaptation to 
new knowledge
Collaboration
Learning drives  
collaboration 
through  
improvement  
and adaptation 
Programme  
outcomes are  
relevant for  
instigating learning 
and developing 
trust
Horizontal account-
ability and learning 
drive performance
ConclusionTable 3. Identifying and prioritizing social issues: Diagnostic tool
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In this report, we have set out the potential for Social  
Impact Bonds as a mechanism for tackling the challenges 
identified in the social entrepreneurship sector in Chile.  
In doing so, we outline the key building blocks of SIBs  
and emphasise what we can learn from the literature  
and case examples. This calls for a complexity-informed 
approach to investment, business models, impact  
measurement and collaboration. We hope that this  
report and the wider evidence on the efficacy of  
outcomes-based funding provides a fruitful platform  
for understanding the investment and support of the  
growing social industry in Chile. 
Diagnostic  
category  
   
  
Problem-solution 
scope
Political-regulatory 
environment
Stakeholder  
involvement
Impact providers
Subcategory
Problem significance
Provision quality
Provision innovation 
requirements
Political agenda priority 
SIB entry barriers 
Regulatory 
issue complexity 
Investment availability 
Collaborative scope
Stakeholder alignment
Impact-driven service 
providers
Outcome delineation
Providers’ accountability 
capacity
Description
Level of vulnerability of the affected target groups.
Quality of current provision of social services for 
target groups.
Level and urgency of innovation required by social 
service provision, either in terms of approach to 
social service delivery or the delivery itself.
Level of political willingness to address the target 
social problem / group and innovate in social  
service provision.
Level of legal, regulatory and ethical entry barriers 
for the development and functioning of the SIB.
Degree of complexity of the regulatory landscape 
underlying the social issue / target group under 
consideration.
Extent of presence, pertinence and availability of 
social investment and investors.
Degree of group awareness, interconnectedness 
and openness of prospective SIB actors*.
Extent to which prospective SIB actors* share views 
on social issue, collaboration and learning.
Amount of impact-driven providers operating in the 
problem-solution space or potentially interested in 
entering the space.
Extent to which the desired outcomes for the target 
group are clearly defined.
Extend to which prospective impact-driven  
providers are capable of measuring their impacts 
and assess the means through which those impact 
were created.
* Outcome funder, investors, SPV, impact-driven providers, lawyers and impact evaluators
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